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Daniel Greco's avatar

I agree with the political point of this post, but want to discuss some of the ideas about signaling, and in particular the idea that signals have to be costly to be credible.

That's either not always true, or if it is, it's only under a broader notion of "cost" than what we usually intend.

The classic case where it is true is where there are two types, wealthy and poor, and everybody would prefer others think they're one type rather than the other (wealthy rather than poor). In that setting, to send a credible signal that you're wealthy rather than poor, you need a signal whose cost is prohibitively expensive for the poor, but not for the wealthy. Saying "I'm wealthy" won't do, because poor people can easily say that. But wearing a Rolex, or driving a Ferrari, will do, because poor people can't afford to send those signals.

But just move a little bit to a setting where not everybody *wants* to be understood as the same type. E.g., we're handing out free ice cream, and the choices are chocolate or vanilla. You're asked which one you want. You say "chocolate". That is a credible signal that you prefer chocolate. Is it a costly signal? In the pre-theoretical, intuitive sense, obviously not. It costs no effort or resources to mouth the word "chocolate". Why does it still work? Because the signal *would* be costly if you were the other type-it would lead to your getting your less preferred flavor. So in the relevant sense for signaling theory, it's a costly signal, in that it's an easier signal for someone who likes chocolate to send than it is for someone who likes vanilla. But in the intuitive sense, it's not a costly signal.

I think lots of boring, regular communication is like this. The signals are not costly, but they're still credible, because not everybody wants to be seen as the same type. If you ask someone where they're from, and they say "New Jersey", that's credible, because if they weren't from New Jersey, they probably wouldn't want you to think they were. It's only in the special case where everybody wants to be seen as the same type that you need signals to be costly in the traditional sense.

What's the relevance to politics/your post? I don't think there's any obvious tendency for olive branches to become less credible/costly over time, so long as you have a bunch of people who want to be seen as partisan warriors/don't want to be seen as cooperators. The idea that you'd need a signal "costlier" than olive branches only holds if even non-cooperators want people to think they're cooperators. And (sadly!) I don't think that's where we are. Though I admit it would be nice if we got there.

Jan Zilinsky's avatar

Great piece, Kyle. As you note, saying a good word about MTG doesn't amount to forgetting/excusing past vitriolic behavior.

I'm not sure I necessarily believe her statement about regret (internal states are unobservable), but her opinion change about the president seems genuine and works as an occasional reminder that some people supported Trump because policy promises he made (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1532673X241295688).

A fashionable and comforting story is that people fell into a personality cult. Stories like MTG ending her loyal soldier posture suggest that people pay attention to substance too.

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